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 Antidiscrimination laws have resonated in American life in profound ways, but few areas 
of our society have been affected as much as the workplace.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 was a sweeping measure of reform and change that prohibited employment decisions based 
on an employee’s race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.1  This statute applies to all public 
sector employers and to most private sector employers.2  Title VII, however, also concerns the 
First Amendment Free Exercise rights3 of religious organizations, and the tension between the 
rights of religious employers and their employees’ own religious beliefs sets the stage for the 
statutory exemption for religious organizations.         
 In 1987, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Corporation of Presiding 
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,4 which resulted in a dramatic 
interpretation of the § 702 exemption5 for religious organizations from the requirements of the 
Civil Rights Act.  Congress, in enacting § 702, gave “traditional religious organizations such as 
churches, synagogues, and religious educational institutions”6 the ability to hire and fire based on 
the employee’s religion.  In 1972, the exemption was amended to exclude all of a religious 
organization’s activities from the reach of Title VII, not just its religious activities.7  In Amos, the 
Court was presented with the question of whether applying the § 702 exemption to the “secular 
nonprofit activities of religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
                                                 
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1964); see also MARGARET C. JASPER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW UNDER TITLE 
VII, at 1 (1999); Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title VII and 
Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 730 (1996).    
2 MICHAEL WOLF ET AL., RELIGION IN THE WORKPLACE 2 (1998).   
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. 
4 483 U.S. 327 (1987).   
5 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1).   
6 Thomas M. Messner, Can Parachurch Organizations Hire and Fire on the Basis of Religion Without Violating 
Title VII?, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63 (2006).   
7 This exemption, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, provides, in part: “This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a 
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society of its activities.”  Id. 
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Amendment.”8  The Court, in a divided opinion, ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the § 
702 exemption as applied to all secular (not just religious) nonprofit activities conducted by 
religious organizations.9  This decision sparked a wave of debate over whether the Court’s 
holding, in effect, granted more freedom to discriminate on religious grounds than was necessary 
to allow religious groups to maintain their autonomy and belief systems.       
 One question that was raised by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall in concurrence, and 
which the Court has not since revisited, was the issue of nonprofit activities.  The majority held 
that it would allow the nonprofit secular activities of religious organizations to come in under § 
702 without requiring courts to engage in case-by-case analysis of which activities are religious 
and which are secular.10  The Court did not, however, address or dwell on a specific definition of 
“nonprofit,” but rather merely used the word.  Justice Brennan, however, in concurrence, wrote, 
“I believe that the particular character of nonprofit activity makes inappropriate a case-by-case 
determination whether its nature is religious or secular.”11  Justice Brennan agreed that courts 
should not engage in case-by-case inquiries, but he based this decision on the nature of nonprofit 
activities.  Thus, a precise definition of “nonprofit” would support the Court’s decision to exempt 
the religious and secular activities of religious organizations because only a specific class of 
nonprofit activities—whatever the Court would include in its definition—would receive such a 
broad exemption.  A narrower definition, however, will also eventually require case-specific 
determinations of whether an organization’s activities are “nonprofit.”   
                                                 
8 483 U.S. at 329-30.   
9 Id. at 339 (“It cannot be seriously contended that § 702 impermissibly entangles church and state; the statute 
effectuates a more complete separation of the two and avoids the kind of intrusive inquiry into religious belief that 
the District Court engaged in in this case.”).   
10 Id. at 329-30 (holding that applying the § 702 exemption to the secular nonprofit activities of religious 
organizations did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).   
11 Id. at 340 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).   
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 This paper will explore the issue of what constitutes a “nonprofit” activity for purposes of 
the § 702 exemption for religious organizations under Amos.  Part I explores the history of 
exemptions for religious organizations from federal statutes of general applicability, looking at 
the arguments for and against freedom from governmental interference for these organizations.  
Part II examines the Civil Rights Act, its legislative history, and the exemption under § 702 for 
religious organizations.  Part III provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s decision in Amos, 
focusing in particular on the concurrences of Justices Brennan and O’Connor, and the justices’ 
arguments regarding nonprofit activities of religious organizations.  Part IV explores the 
meanings and definitions of nonprofit activity that have arisen in various contexts, in order to 
provide a framework by which to analyze nonprofit activities that are exempt from Title VII’s 
requirements.  Part V shows why the Supreme Court must clarify its holding in Amos by 
explaining the types of “nonprofit activity” that would qualify for the § 702 exemption.  This 
part also provides some possible definitions or interpretations, based on the available sources.  
Because the Supreme Court’s holding in Amos is only supposed to extend to the nonprofit 
activities of a church, synagogue, or educational institution, it is troubling that the definition of 
“nonprofit” has not been visited.  In order to ensure that the § 702 exemption for religious 
organizations does not go further than is necessary to protect their Free Exercise rights, thus 
protecting the aims of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it will eventually be necessary for courts to 
engage in case-by-case inquiries of whether the religious organizations in question are nonprofit.   
I.  THE DEBATE OVER RELIGIOUS AUTONOMY AND FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL MANDATES 
 
 Religious communities are central to many people’s religious identities and beliefs.12  
Although individuals often have personal or solitary religious experiences, many still perpetuate 
                                                 
12 BETTE NOVIT EVANS, INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN 
PLURALISM 121-22 (1997). 
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their religious experiences through “collective activities.”  Therefore, courts have developed a 
“Free Exercise jurisprudence that goes beyond protecting individual beliefs and posits that 
religious institutions may have First Amendment rights not reducible to the rights of individual 
members.”13  Professor Evans notes that because the activities of religious organizations 
encompass not only the ceremonial, but also “education[], healing, broadcasting, and social 
service ministries, in addition to the financial arrangements supporting them,” the protection of 
religious practices under the Free Exercise Clause has necessarily come to mean protection of all 
of these activities.14  The protection has also extended to the “decisions regarding the ordinary 
housekeeping details of institutional existence.”15  These rationales have led to statutory 
exemptions for religious institutions in multiple contexts.   
A.  History and Rationale for Early Statutory Religious Exemptions  
David Steinberg explains that early statutory religious exemptions took three different 
forms: (1) legislatures exempted religious pacifists from mandatory military service; (2) early 
state constitutional provisions exempted religious believers from testimonial oaths if taking them 
conflicted with religious beliefs; and (3) during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
states and colonies maintained state-endorsed churches and collected taxes to support the 
churches; “assessment statutes” often exempted religious dissenters.16  This institutional 
                                                 
13 Id. at 122-23.  Evans write, “Many thinkers now argue that institutions, in their own right, merit constitutional 
protection even when individual conscience claims are not involved, and perhaps even when doing so compromises 
the rights of individual members (citation omitted).  The focus on groups and institutions implicates the broader 
questions of pluralism and the role of autonomous associations in the American polity.”  Id. at 123. 
14 EVANS, supra note 12, at 123; but see Employment Div. v. Smith 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (“We have never 
held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting 
conduct that the State is free to regulate.”).  
15 EVANS, supra note 12, at 123 (emphasis added).  These “ordinary housekeeping details” have caused some of the 
most contentious debate surrounding the free exercise rights of religious institutions and their ability to discriminate 
on the basis of religion in, for example, the hiring of building engineers, janitors, or secretaries who had no 
involvement in the propagation of the institution’s religious mission.  See discussion infra Part III.   
16 David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. 
REV. 241 (1995) (citing Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1466-73 (1990)).  
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autonomy for religious organizations extended to protection from “excessive entanglement” by 
the government, a doctrine recognized in the Supreme Court decisions of Waltz v. Tax 
Commission17 and Lemon v. Kurtzman.18  
 In Waltz, the Supreme Court upheld the New York City Tax Commission’s property tax 
exemptions granted to religious organizations for properties used solely for religious purposes.  
The Court held that this was not an unconstitutional attempt to establish or sponsor religion, or to 
interfere with free exercise rights, noting that, “Separation [of church and state] in this context 
cannot mean absence of all contact; the complexities of modern life inevitably produce some 
contact . . . .”19  Thus, the government may not impermissibly or excessively entangle itself in 
religious affairs, but some contact, even in the form of exemptions, is acceptable.  On the other 
hand, in Lemon, the Supreme Court held that a Rhode Island statute, consisting of salary 
supplements for teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic schools and operating to the benefit of 
parochial schools, and also involving comprehensive state oversight, was unconstitutional 
because the government was excessively entangled with religion.  The court also held that a 
Pennsylvania statute, entailing reimbursement of nonpublic schools of teachers’ salaries, 
textbooks, and instructional materials used in the teaching of secular subjects, and involving 
direct aid to church schools and comprehensive oversight over operations, was unconstitutional 
because the government was excessively entangled with religion.20  
                                                 
17 397 U.S. 664 (1970).   
18 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  Professor Evans explains that, “[N]umerous Free Exercise claims are predicated upon the 
resistance of religious institutions to state scrutiny, certification, record keeping, and the like, and the state’s 
hesitation to become involved in such entanglement.  Not surprisingly, the arguments for religious institutional 
autonomy frequently overlap between these two religion clauses.”  EVANS, supra note 12, at 125. 
19 Waltz, 397 U.S. at 676 (“Adherence to the policy of neutrality that derives from an accommodation of the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has prevented the kind of involvement that would tip the balance toward 
government control of churches or governmental restraint on religious practice.”).   
20 403 U.S. at 618-22.  Lemon is still good law, but it is widely criticized.  See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Corporation of Presiding 
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
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Other reasons have been offered for why religion should be afforded special protection 
from government interference.  Alan Brownstein suggests that religion furthers several “social 
purposes.”  First, it serves as an independent source of values, which are “structurally divorced 
from government,” thus promoting democracy because religion develops values that can 
counterbalance government decisions.21  This arguably justifies enforcement of the Free Exercise 
Clause for religious organizations because they help to reinforce these values.  Religion also 
often has a communal element, allowing people, who are increasingly individualized in our 
society, to congregate together and interact in society, especially in houses of worship.22  Finally, 
many established religions are “grounded in tradition” or “institutions that operate over the long 
term and are less likely to be swayed by the passions of the moment.”23  Of course, even long-
lasting religious institutions can suddenly change positions on certain issues, and many other 
religious institutions or organizations might not be grounded in tradition.  Brownstein illustrates, 
however, why religious organizations have received high governmental deference.24 
The rights of religious organizations often come at the expense of individual Free 
Exercise rights.  In Wisconsin v. Yoder, for example, the Supreme Court allowed Old Amish 
Order religious authorities the Free Exercise right to take Amish children out of school after the 
eighth grade; this “gave the broader religious community the right to perpetuate its faith by 
imposing significant disadvantages upon those who might consider rejecting the faith.”25  Steven 
                                                                                                                                                             
concurring in judgment) (claiming that the majority appeared to think that the “effects” prong of Lemon would not 
be implicated as long as the government action is characterized as “‘allowing’” religious organizations to advance 
religion (as opposed to directly advancing it)).  Id. at 347.   
21 Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 55, 92 (2006).   
22 Id. at 95.   
23 Id. at 96 (citing BENJAMIN BEIT-HALLAHMI & MICHAEL ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR, 
BELIEF & EXPERIENCE 98-112 (“[c]ontinuity in religious identity between generations is the rule rather than the 
exception”)).    
24 Id. at 97.  
25 Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion under the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U PITT. L. REV. 75, 89 (1990). 
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Gey explains that the “religious imperatives perceived by the authorities of a particular faith will 
always include the need to inculcate sacred values and reject the profane,” which is “always an 
assault on freedom of conscience.”26  
B.  Arguments Against Absolute Freedom for Religious Organizations  
 Brownstein also acknowledges that the rights of religious institutions are not absolute, 
and that balancing is always required when weighing government interests against the free 
exercise of religion.  He notes that one of the commonly expressed concerns with extending extra 
protection to Free Exercise rights is that exemptions will induce people to “practice religion or 
espouse a particular faith,” and that “exempting religious institutions such as schools, day care 
center, and recreational programs from the regulatory burden[s] . . . will allow them to provide 
less costly, more efficient, and more cohesive services than their secular competitors.”27 
Others argue that autonomy for religious institutions is not as sacrosanct as many would 
believe.  Professor Evans cites Ira Lupu, who argues that the right to freedom of religious 
worship has traditionally been considered an individual, not collective, right.  Evans explains: 
Institutions do not have group rights beyond that which individuals would have.  
Thus, individuals may have associational rights to form ‘members only’ groups 
that may imply a right to hire church members only.  But since individuals have 
no right to discriminate on the basis of race or sex, neither do religious 
institutions, religious doctrine notwithstanding.  Lupu concludes that the Free 
Exercise Clause does not require exemptions for religious organizations and that, 
moreover, the Establishment Clause forbids them.  To grant such exemptions 
would enable dominant groups to gain rights unavailable to others, thus 
threatening the principle of equal religious liberty.28   
                                                 
26 Id. at 90.  Gey argues that courts will still uphold the dictates of the religious organization under the 
“accommodation principle,” which allows religious participants to receive considerations that are not given to the 
nonreligious, i.e., where governments grants a statutory accommodation of religion (the accommodation could also 
be mandatory).  Id. at 80-81.  He does acknowledge that the principle is “not absolute.”  Cf. Employment Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).     
27 Id. at 131 (noting that an exemption having “force as an inducement does not necessarily require that a court reject 
it [because] the power of an exemption to induce religious belief ad practice should be part of the balancing analysis 
a court undertakes in adjudicating a free exercise claim,” id. at 132). 
28 Id. at 126 (citing Ira Lupu, Free Exercise Exemptions and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment 
Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 422 (1987)). 
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Likewise, Steven Gey suggests that the Supreme Court has transformed the principle of religious 
accommodation from protection for minority or dissenting individuals into a “way of enforcing 
the norms of the religious community.”29 
Courts have also upheld enforcement of statutes of general applicability against religious 
organizations, even when the organizations call for an exemption.  In a recent case, Catholic 
Charities v. Superior Court,30 the California Supreme Court held that California did not 
impermissibly interfere with internal church governance matters in enforcing a statute that 
“implicate[d] the relationship between a nonprofit public benefit corporation and its employees, 
most of whom do not belong to the Catholic Church.  Only those who join a church impliedly 
consent to its religious governance on matters of faith and discipline.”31  Thus, courts will not 
always defer to the institutional autonomy of religious organizations, at least in the context of a 
church-affiliated entity), and when the employees’ own beliefs might be compromised.  
Some go so far as to suggest that exemptions for religious institutions from statutes of 
general applicability should be categorically rejected because the difficulties outweigh the 
advantages of allowing for exemptions.  These difficulties include the idea that exemptions 
“require courts to engage in difficult and intrusive inquiries into the sincerity and religiosity of 
beliefs,”32 and “unfairly favor certain religious beliefs over other religious and nonreligious 
                                                 
29 Id. at 135 (quoting Gey, supra note 25, at 94-95). 
30 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).  Catholic Charities sought an exemption from a California state law, WCEA, which 
required employers to provide employees health insurance plans that covered medically prescribed contraceptives; 
this law would force Catholic Charities to violate the tenets of Catholicism, which forbids the use of contraceptives.  
California refused to grant an exemption, primarily because doing so would privilege a religious organization by 
relieving it of the costs that other employers had to incur; however, the state also refused to grant the exemption 
because then Catholic Charities employees would be denied insurance coverage guaranteed by statute, or the state 
would have to assume the cost.  Id. at 75-76.  See also Brownstein, supra note 21, at 101-02. 
31 85 P.3d at 77.   
32 Steinberg, supra note 16, at 268 (citations omitted). 
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beliefs.”33  Additionally, Steinberg explains the argument that the courts lack the “institutional 
authority” to mandate exemptions.  Under the “originalist” argument, a legislature’s power to 
enact religious exemptions derives from its general power to promote the welfare of its citizens; 
the Free Exercise Clause does not give courts such authority.34  The institutionalist argument 
states that that elected officials are better equipped to create exemptions.  If a claimant is relying 
on a legislative exemption, a court does not have to balance the religious interests served by the 
exemption against the state interests; but this balancing is necessary with court-mandated 
exemptions because courts often favor familiar, orthodox religions over minority faiths.35  
 Individuals or organizations might also assert “sham claims” that a law imposes burdens 
on their religious beliefs and practices; these might be “constitutional tools that can be used all 
too easily by unscrupulous persons or institutions to avoid unpleasant regulatory obligations.”36  
However, Brownstein suggests that this problem is exaggerated, since an organization that 
invokes a Free Exercise exemption might therefore also become ineligible for government 
subsidies, or conditions might be attached to the exemption that make it too much trouble to 
exert a “sham” Free Exercise claim.  Ultimately, however, Brownstein acknowledges that 
fraudulent claims cannot be avoided entirely, and courts should not overlook the possibility that 
they will be brought.37 
II.  THE § 702 EXEMPTION: AN OVERVIEW OF ITS MERITS AND COMPLICATIONS 
The First Amendment states, in part: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”38  Unlike race, gender, 
                                                 
33 Steinberg, supra note 16, at 268 (citations omitted).   
34 Id. at 269. 
35 Id. at 271-72. 
36 Brownstein, supra note 21, at 132 (citations omitted).   
37 Id. at 133-34. 
38 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Courts consider First Amendment rights to be “fundamental” and are willing to guard 
them more carefully than other constitutional rights.     
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and national origin, which are immutable characteristics, religion involves beliefs and conduct, 
both of which can present clashes between an employee’s beliefs and an employer’s need to run 
the workplace in a practical, efficient manner.  However, the high level of deference that the 
courts and Congress give to freedom of religion under the First Amendment has translated into 
employers having to adjust their operations, scheduling practices, and distribution of duties in 
order to accommodate their employees’ religious beliefs.     
A. Background of the Amendments to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act  
Congress enacted the Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act to remedy the 
problems of enforcing the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Senator Hawkins, from the 
Committee of Education and Labor, explained in his report submitted to accompany H.R. 1746, 
that, in spite of the progress made since the 1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted, “discrimination 
against minorities and women continues.  The persistence of discrimination, and its detrimental 
effects [sic.] require a reaffirmation of our national policy of equal opportunity in 
employment.”39  Likewise, Chairman Brown of the Committee on Education and Labor, declared 
during his testimony on the enactment of the 1971 Act: 
In this the 7th year of since historic enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and the 6th year since the establishment of the EEOC, it is no longer possible to 
deny effective enforcement of one of the major provisions of the act, the right for 
all people in this Nation, regardless of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 
to have equal rights to jobs for which they are qualified.40  
                                                 
39 Testimony of Representatives Hawkins, H.R. 92-238 (92d Congress, 1st Sess.), Equal Employment Opportunities 
Enforcement Act of 1971, to accompany H.R. 1746, at 3 (June 2, 1971).  The 1972 amendment was part of a series 
of sweeping changes made to the Civil Rights Act when Congress enacted the Equal Opportunities Enforcement Act 
of 1971.  Senator Hawkins, in his report accompanying House Report 1746 on the 1971 Act, explained that the 
purpose of the bill was to grant to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) the authority to issue 
judicially enforceable case and desist orders; to transfer the Attorney General’s authority in practice or pattern 
discrimination suits to the EEOC; broaden jurisdictional coverage by deleting existing exemptions of state and local 
government employees and employees connected with educational institutions; and extend some protection to 
federal employees.  Id.   
40 Testimony of Rep. Brown, H.R. 92-238 (92d Congress, 1st Sess.), Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement 
Act of 1971, to accompany H.R. 1746, at 70 (June 2, 1971).  Representative Brown concluded his testimony with, “I 
would again like to urge the committee . . . to remedy the defects of title VII as soon as possible, and to grant the 
EEOC the most effective enforcement powers possible so that the promises made in 1964 can become realities in 
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It is clear, therefore, that Congress intended to strengthen and actually enforce the 
requirements of the Civil Rights Act, instead of simply relying on the voluntary commitment of 
employers.  Additionally, shortly before this testimony took place, in May of 1971, the EEOC 
issued a policy statement on religious and national origin discrimination to all compliance 
agencies.41  In 1972, Congress also amended Title VII to require an employer or labor 
organization to “reasonably accommodate” the religious practices of an employee or prospective 
employee, unless such an accommodation would result in undue hardship on the business; an 
undue hardship requires “more than a de minimis cost.”42  If there was more than one method 
that would not cause undue hardship, the employer would have to provide the alternative that 
“least disadvantages the individual with respect to his or her employment opportunities.”43   
B.  Congress Created an Exemption for Religious Organizations from Title VII’s Mandates  
However, an equally important aspect of freedom of religion in the workplace concerns 
the employment decisions of religious organizations and entities, which also have Free Exercise 
rights to structure their organizations and govern themselves in accordance with their own 
religious tenets.44  Courts traditionally allow religious organizations to hire, fire, and promote 
employees based on the organizations’ religious tenets or principles.  This has stemmed from the 
government’s reluctance to “entangle” itself in religion, but also to permit religious entities to 
promote and adhere to their own religious beliefs.45  
Section 702 of Title VII was included with the original passage of the Act to exempt 
                                                                                                                                                             
1971.”  Id. at 73.  Clearly, the Committee was concerned with the rampant employment discrimination that persisted 
even seven years after the Civil Rights Act was enacted.    
41 H.R. 92-238 (92d Congress, 1st Sess.), Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971, to accompany 
H.R. 1746, at 78 (June 2, 1971).   
42 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964), amended by Pub. 
L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (emphasis added); JASPER, supra note 1, at 18; WOLF ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.   
43 See sources cited supra note 42; see also infra discussion Part I.  This paper will concern the implications of Title 
VII for religious employers and their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.     
44 See supra Part I.A (discussing the history of statutory exemptions for religious organizations). 
45 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).   
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religious organizations/employers from the Act’s requirements in employment decisions related 
to an organization’s religious mission; in other words, they could exercise preferences based on 
religion in employment decisions affecting religious activities.46  Otherwise, Title VII could 
“hinder the free exercise right of religious organizations to choose only members of their own 
religion to carry out their religious mission.”47  Similarly, imposing Title VII’s prohibitions on 
religious organizations would excessively entangle the government in religious affairs.48  
However, exempting religious organizations altogether, instead of only activities related to their 
religious mission, could violate the Establishment Clause because religious organizations would 
be favored over secular employers.  Employees and prospective employees would also be 
hindered from exercising their own religious beliefs while pursuing employment opportunities.   
1.  A Statutory Amendment Broadened the § 702 Exemption in 1972     
In 1972, however, Congress amended the 702 exemption to allow religion to play a role 
in all of a religious organization’s employment decisions, “regardless of the particular job [for] 
which the individual is being considered”49—primarily on the basis that “compliance with civil 
rights laws sometimes requires acts the religion finds unacceptable.”50  Congress determined that 
it could not allow religious employers to discriminate on the basis of sex, race, or national origin, 
but that it would grant them an exemption for religious discrimination.  The newly amended § 
702 read: “This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to 
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational 
                                                 
46 Scott D. McClure, Religious Preferences in Employment Decisions: How Far May Religious Organizations Go?, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 587, 592; Messner, supra note 6, at 78-81 (providing a history of the § 702 amendment).   
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 Section-by-section analysis of S. 2515, The Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, Sec. 3, at 1770 
(expanding the exemption for religious corporations, associations, educational institutions, or societies).   
50 EVANS, supra note 12, at 133.  These employment decisions could include restricting certain jobs to men and 
certain jobs to women, or employing only people who subscribe to the institution’s religious doctrines.   
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institution, or society of its activities.”51  The absence of “religious activities” language indicates 
that the amendment greatly expanded the scope of the § 702 exemption.  Even this exemption, 
however, since it only allows for discrimination based on religious grounds, still “force[s] courts 
to weigh the relative value of individual rights granted under the law against the pluralist value 
of autonomy for groups to live by their own values.”52  It also forces courts to give religious 
institutions a privilege in hiring decisions that other kinds of employers do not have.     
2.  The Legislative History of the Amended § 702 Reveals the Difficulties With 
    Expanding the Exemption 
 
The legislative history of Title VII is telling in its illustration of the changes Congress 
made to the exemption in favor of religious group rights.  Interestingly, the House of 
Representatives’s § 702 draft had exempted religious institutions for all purposes, but the Senate 
amended the exception and rejected this categorical exemption, allowing religious organizations 
to discriminate only for its religious activities.  When it was first proposed in the House of 
Representatives, it contained an exemption for all religious corporations, associations, and 
societies,53 but when the statute was enacted in 1964, it was narrowed so that religious 
organizations could give preferences to employees of specific religions in jobs relating to the 
organization’s religious activities.  It did not permit these organizations to discriminate on other 
bases.54  In the 1972 amendments, Congress deleted the words “religious activities” in § 702(a), 
indicating that a religious organization/employer could discriminate on the basis of religion in 
any of its capacities.  Wolf suggests that this statutory exemption is actually broader than the 
                                                 
51 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (amended 1972).   
52 EVANS, supra note 12, at 134.   
53 WOLF ET AL., supra note 2, at 19 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88 Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1963)). 
54 WOLF ET AL., supra note 2, at 19 (citing Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, Section 702).   
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First Amendment because it because it covers a wider range of church-affiliated employers, and 
it allows organizations to hire only employees of the particular religious faith.55   
Several senators, during the debates over the amendment, argued strenuously against it.  
Senator Williams, for example, advocated that, “Of all the institutions in this country that should 
be setting the example of equal employment opportunity . . ., it is America’s religious 
institutions.”56  He also suggested that it might be “unconstitutional for Congress to permit such 
discrimination. . . . In providing [services like hospitals and others] they should not be allowed to 
become instruments of invidious and unreasonable discrimination in employment.”57  Senator 
Ervin, however, after reading during his testimony from the Supreme Court case Everson v. 
Board of Education,58 argued that the employment decisions of religious organizations should 
not be subject to any regulation by the EEOC, even for secular activities (another possible 
amendment during the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act had been to allow 
the EEOC to regulate the non-religious activities of religious employers):  
[W]e do not erect a wall of separation between church and state when we permit 
the agents of the state to tell a religious corporation, a religious association, a 
religious educational institution, or a religious society, whom it is to employ for 
an purpose, whom it is to promote for any purpose, or whom it may discharge for 
any reason.59       
 
                                                 
55 Id. at 21.   
56 Cong. Rec., Feb. 21, 1972, Amendments Nos. 907 and 908, at 1666.  Senator Williams also claimed that religious 
institutions’ integrity would not be compromised by requiring them to provide equal job opportunities for employees 
in positions that were unrelated to the institutions’ religious activities.  Id. at 1665-66 (pointing out that such 
employees perform jobs identical to those in similar secular institutions and that these persons “should be given the 
same equal employment opportunities”).  Senator Williams suggests that coverage under this statute should extend 
to a private hospital owned or operated by a religious organization; a private school or orphanage owned or operated 
by a religious organization; commercial establishments or religious organizations that produce or sell products like 
alcoholic beverages, baked goods, religious goods, etc.; and the administrative, executive, and other personnel that 
religious organizations employ.  Id. at 1666.   
57 Id. at 12450.   
58 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (“In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to 
erect ‘a wall of separation between church and state’” (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).).  
This senator speaks for thirteen pages in the Congressional Record, reading large excerpts from Reynolds, in his 
advocacy for allowing the EEOC to be able to regulate any affairs of a religious organization.     
59 Cong. Rec., Feb. 21, 1972, Amendments Nos. 907 and 908, at 1221.   
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In spite of the debate, the amendment passed.  Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court 
received an opportunity to clarify its scope and determine its constitutionality. 
III.  OVERVIEW OF CORP. OF PRESIDING BISHOP OF CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS V. AMOS 
 
 In Amos, the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether applying the 
Title VII § 702 exemption to religious organizations’ secular activities violated the 
Establishment Clause.  
A.  The Majority Held that § 702 Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause 
The Amos decision involved the Deseret Gymnasium in Salt Lake City, Utah, a nonprofit 
facility open to the public, and run by the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints (hereinafter “Church”).60  Arthur Mayson had worked at the Desert 
Gymnasium for approximately sixteen years as a building engineer.  He and others were 
discharged in 1981 for failing to qualify for “temple recommends:” certificates that they were 
members of the Church and eligible to attend its temples.61  Recommends were only issued to 
individuals who observed Church standards in areas like regular church attendance, tithing, and 
abstinence from coffee, tea, alcohol, and tobacco.62  Mayson and others sued, claiming religious 
discrimination under Title VII, but the Church invoked the § 702 exemption in its defense.   
The district court determined that Mayson’s job situation involved nonreligious 
activities.63  The court next applied the three-part Lemon v. Kurtzman test to determine if the § 
                                                 
60 Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 483 U.S. 327, 
330 (1987).   
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 330 n.4.   
63 Id. at 332.  The court’s three-part test for determining whether one of the employer’s religious activities was at 
issue involved the following: (1) examining the tie between the religious organization and the activity at issue in the 
context of financial affairs, day-to-day operations and management, etc.; (2) in determining whether or not there was 
a “close and substantial tie” between the two, the court must look at “the nexus between the primary function of the 
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702 exemption violated the Establishment Clause, and held that § 702 failed the second part of 
Lemon because it had the “primary effect of advancing religion.”64  The court determined that § 
702 singled out religious entities for a benefit, that it was not supported by long historical 
tradition, and that it burdened the free exercise rights of employees who worked in nonreligious 
jobs of religious institutions.  The court thus found that the amendment was unconstitutional “as 
applied to secular activity.”65 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court in 1987, but it determined that it did not 
need to reexamine the case under Lemon because the § 702 exemption was “in no way 
questionable under the Lemon analysis.”66  The first prong of Lemon, the “purpose” requirement, 
aimed only at preventing the government from acting with the intent of promoting or advancing 
a particular religion.67  Thus, the Court agreed with the district court’s determination that 
Congress’s legislative purpose of alleviating “significant governmental interference with the 
ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions”68 did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.  The Court suggested, however, that it was a  
significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial 
liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious.  
The line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might understandably be 
concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of 
mission.  Fear of potential liability might affect the way an organization carried 
out what it understood to be its religious mission.69         
 
                                                                                                                                                             
activity in question and the religious rituals or tenets of the religious organization or matters of church 
administration”; and (3) if the “tie between the religious entity and activity in question is either close or remote 
under the first prong . . . and the nexus between the primary function of the activity . . . and the religious tenets or 
rituals of the religious organization or matters of church administration is tenuous or non-existent, the court must 
engage in a third inquiry. . . . the relationship between the nature of the job the employee is performing and the 
religious rituals or tenets of the religious organization or matters of church administration.  If there is a substantial 
relationship . . ., the court must find that the activity in question is religious.”  Id. at 332 n.6.  
64 Id. at 333.   
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 335. 
67 Id.; see also McClure, supra note 46, at 589 (providing an overview of Amos). 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 336.   
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This excerpt defined the court’s reasoning for the entire decision.  The difficulty in forcing 
religious organizations to categorize their activities as either religious or secular would, the Court 
feared, unduly hinder the free exercise of religion.   
 The Court also reasoned that the second requirement under Lemon—that the primary 
effects of the law neither inhibit nor advance religion—was not violated by § 702; the Court 
stated that a law that simply allowed religious organizations to advance their own religion was 
not the same as the government advancing religion through its own activities and influence.70  
The Court stated that it had “never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to 
religious groups are per se invalid,” which would “run contrary to the teaching of our cases that 
there is ample room for accommodation of religion under the Establishment Clause.”71   
 The Court determined that § 702 did not offend the Equal Protection Clause72 by giving 
less protection to the employees of religious employers than to employees of secular employers; 
this statute was facially neutral and was motivated by the permissible purpose of removing 
government interference with religious organizations’ free exercise of religion.  Therefore, since 
strict scrutiny did not apply, the Court applied the rational basis test and found § 702 to be 
rationally related to a legitimate purpose—alleviating governmental interference with religious 
organizations’ ability to define and perpetuate their own religious activities.73  Finally, the 
Supreme Court decided that § 702 did not “entangle[] church and state; the statute effectuate[d] a 
more complete separation of the two and avoid[ed] the kind of intrusive inquiry into religious 
belief that the District Court engaged in in this case.”74  Ultimately then, the Court opted in favor 
of a categorical exemption from Title VII’s mandates for religious organizations’ religious and 
                                                 
70 Id. at 336. 
71 Id. at 338.  
72 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
73 Id. at 339.  
74 Id. 
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secular activities—the “nonprofit activities of religious employers”75—rather than forcing the 
organizations or courts to decide which activities were religious and which were secular.   
 The Court had noted that the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints was organized as a nonprofit corporation under § 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, but it mentioned this only in a footnote, and the Court did not explicitly 
state that all nonprofit activities under its holding would have to qualify under § 501(c)(3).76   
B.  Justices Brennan and Marshall’s Concurrence: Discussing the “Nonprofit” Difficulties 
 
 In their concurrence, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall pressed that the judgment in 
Amos involved a “challenge to the application of § 702’s categorical exemption to the activities 
of a nonprofit organization. . . . that the particular character of nonprofit activity makes 
inappropriate a case-by-case determination whether its nature is religious or secular.”77  He 
recognized that religious organizations have a legitimate “interest in autonomy in ordering their 
internal affairs, so that they may be free to: ‘select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, 
resolve their own disputes, and run their own institutions.’”78  He justified this line of thought by 
explaining that a Church’s ability to commit itself to its religious mission furthers individual 
religious freedom as well because of individuals’ participation in larger religious communities.  
Brennan then explained that, “if certain activities constitute part of a religious community’s 
practice, then a religious organization should be able to require that only members of its 
community perform those activities.”79   
                                                 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 330 n.3.    
77 Id. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring).   
78 Id. at 341 (recognizing that religion contains communal elements for most believers, and that religious 
organizations must therefore be protected by the Free Exercise Clause, since individuals often worship through the 
vehicle of a religious organization).   
79 Id. at 343 (explaining that the “infringement on religious liberty that results from conditioning performance of 
secular activity upon religious belief cannot be defended as necessary for the community’s self-definition”).   
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 In spite of his emphasis on the importance of an organization’s “religious mission,” 
Brennan explained that applying the exemption only to an organization’s religious activities 
would be too difficult because the character of an activity is not obvious.  Courts would have to 
engage in a “searching, case-by-case analysis,” which would result in “considerable ongoing 
government entanglement in religious affairs.”80  Moreover, this entanglement might result in the 
chilling of a religious organization’s free exercise of religion.81  The organization might 
characterize as religious only those activities over which it is certain there would be no dispute, 
in order to avoid employment-related litigation.   
 Justice Brennan then moved into the “nonprofit” aspect of his analysis.  He worried that 
the risk of chilling religious organizations’ free exercise activity was “most likely to arise with 
respect to nonprofit activities.”82  He explained that a non-profit entity must “utilize its earnings 
to finance the continued provision of the goods or services it furnishes, and may not distribute 
any surplus to the owners.”83  Thus, nonprofits are organized to provide community services and 
not simply to engage in commerce—churches, therefore, regard the provision of these services as 
a way to fulfill their religious duties.84  Nonprofit activities, therefore, are “most likely to present 
cases in which characterization of the activity as religious or secular will be a close question;” 
Brennan explained that a categorical exemption for all nonprofit activities, whether religious or 
secular, was therefore justified.85  He explained that, “While not every nonprofit activity may be 
operated for religious purposes, the likelihood that many are makes a categorical rule a suitable 
                                                 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 344. 
83 Id. (explaining that this explanation of a nonprofit corporation “makes plausible a church’s contention that an 
entity is not operated simply in order to generate revenues for the church, but that the activities themselves are 
infused with a religious purpose”).  See also Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotton, Contemplating “Enterprise”: 
The Business and Legal Challenges of Social Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 67, 74-75 (2003). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 345.  But see infra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing why nonprofit entities should not be singled 
out for the exemption and discussing the problems with distinguishing nonprofit from for-profit entities in Amos).    
 21
means to avoid chilling the exercise of religion.”86  However, Justice Brennan also suggested, 
albeit in a footnote, that,  
If it were possible easily to transform an enterprise that appeared commercial in 
substance into one nonprofit in form, a church’s decision to do so might signal 
that the church regarded the religious character of an entity as so significant that it 
was willing to forgo direct financial benefits in order to be able to hire persons 
committed to the church’s mission.  Nonetheless, if experience proved that 
nonprofit incorporation was frequently used simply to evade Title VII, I would 
find it necessary to reconsider the judgment in these cases.87 
 
Thus, Justice Brennan was aware of the fact that religious organizations could actually abuse the 
categorical exemption for nonprofit entities, making the Court’s decision potentially overbroad. 
 Justice O’Connor also concurred, noting her frustration with the Lemon test, explaining 
that the Court’s opinion only extended to nonprofit organizations and failed to “acknowledge 
that the amended § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, raises different questions as it is applied to profit 
and nonprofit organizations.”88  She worried that the Court brushed off the “effects” prong of the 
Lemon test: as long as a court could characterize the government action as “‘allowing’” religious 
organizations to advance religion, as opposed to the government action actually “directly 
advancing religion,” Lemon appeared to be met.89  Justice O’Connor, however, felt that, contrary 
to Lemon, in examining an Establishment Clause challenge to a government exemption for 
religious organizations from a regulatory burden, a court would have to acknowledge that such 
an action did advance religion.90  Justice O’Connor stated that in order for a government action 
                                                 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 344 n.4 (emphasis added).  See infra Part V for a discussion of why this sentence is critical to the 
determination that the Supreme Court must revisit its analysis of “nonprofit” and provide a more coherent definition, 
so as to avoid further violations to the Establishment Clause (even though the Supreme Court is not likely to actually 
overturn Amos or hold that the § 702 exemption applies only to religious activities of organizations).     
88 Id. at 346 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
89 Id. at 347.   
90 Id.; see also supra note 20 (outlining several cases that have questioned the validity of Lemon).  
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to be a permissible accommodation of religion, there must actually be an “identifiable burden on 
the exercise of religion that can be said to be lifted by the government action.”91   
 Ultimately, Justice O’Connor explained that the amended exemption will have different 
applications to for-profit and nonprofit activities: “Because there is a probability that a nonprofit 
activity of a religious organization will itself be involved in the organization’s religious mission, 
. . . the objective observer should perceive the Government action as an accommodation of the 
exercise of religion rather than as a Government endorsement of religion.”92  Importantly, Justice 
O’Connor determined that activities that were solely profit-making would not as likely be 
involved in the religious mission of an organization as nonprofit activities would be; thus, the 
“constitutionality of the § 702 exemption as applied to for-profit activities of religious 
organizations remains open.”93      
C.  The EEOC’s Policy Statement of 1987 Supported Only a Narrow Exemption 
 
 The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission issued a Policy Statement clarifying its 
position that “religious organizations and religious educational institutions are not exempt from 
liability under Title VII for discriminating in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment on the basis of religion.”94  It is noteworthy that the EEOC issued its policy 
statement on September 23, 1987, just months after Amos was decided (June 24, 1987).   
The Commission argued that a religious institution may not discriminate in employment 
decisions on the basis of religion.95  The Commission based this ruling on the fact that when the 
                                                 
91 Id. at 348.    
92 Id. at 349. 
93 Id.  
94 EEOC Policy Statement: Religious Organization Exemption under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
Amended (1987), available at www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religious_orgs_exemption.html.         
95 The Commission argued that the rationale of these cases applied to § 703(e)(2) cases as well—this was “enacted 
solely to insure that certain types of religious educational institutions would be exempt from liability for 
discrimination on the basis of religion because several Senators believed that they were not clearly covered by the 
exemption in § 702.”  Id. 
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exemption was adopted in 1964, it only allowed for discrimination based on an organization’s 
religious activities.  The EEOC interpreted this as “unequivocally show[ing] Congress’s intent to 
allow only a very narrow exception for religious institutions.”96  The EEOC also noted that two 
changes to the exemptions were proposed in 1972—one which expanded the exemptions so that 
religious institutions could hire employees of the same religion for all activities, not only those of 
a religious nature, and another, more limited, proposal that would have allowed religious 
organizations to discriminate on any basis.97  Obviously Congress had chosen to circumscribe the 
benefits it granted to religious organizations by not allowing them to discriminate on other bases.  
The EEOC also relied on the rule of statutory construction that “exemptions to remedial statutes 
should be narrowly construed in order that the remedial purpose of the statute not be 
frustrated.”98  The Commission’s interpretation of the § 702 exemption illustrates that it should 
not be read broadly to include more than the religious, nonprofit activities of religious 
organizations—supporting the idea that “nonprofit” should have a narrow meaning under Amos. 
D.  Distinguishing between Religious and Secular Activities of Religious Institutions  
 One of the biggest concerns of the Amos Court was that it did not want courts to have to 
argue with religious institutions about what activities they considered religious and what they 
considered to be secular, political, social, etc.  Bruce Bagni suggests that a distinction can be 
made between the “purely spiritual or integral facets of the actual practice of the religion” and 
three concentric “emanations” from the core.  The first emanation contains church-sponsored 
community activities; the second contains “purely secular business activities” (including 
employment relationships with employees who nonreligious functions); and the third contains 
                                                 
96 Id. 
97 Id. (citing 118 CONG. REC. 946 (statements of Senators Ervin and Allen); 118 CONG. REC. 1982, 1992-95 
(statements of Senators Ervin and Allen); 118 CONG. REC. 4813 (statement of Senator Williams).   
98 Id. (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); A.H. Philips Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 
(1945)).   
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the completely secular world.  He states that once a religious organization is outside its “spiritual 
epicenter,” it has subjected itself to government regulation “proportionate to the degree of 
secularity of its activities and relationships.”99  He argues, however, that the “spiritual epicenter” 
must be completely free from government regulation.  Professor Evans, however, argues that this 
proposal is not helpful because it still requires courts to determine what constitutes a “spiritual 
epicenter” or an “emanation” (which could violate the Free Exercise Clause).100  Another 
alternative, as the Supreme Court decided in Amos, is that “the very act of distinguishing 
religious from nonreligious activities entangles government with religion in ways likely to 
violate both religion clauses.”101  Therefore, courts should not make any distinction at all. 
 Karen Crupi asserts, however, that the Supreme Court has always inquired into the 
religious or secular nature of activities, and that doing this “does not rise to a impermissible level 
of entanglement” because “the very essence of first amendment analysis initially requires the 
judicial separation of religious from secular concerns.”102  In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of 
Chicago, for example, the Supreme Court looked into the religious or secular nature of teachers’ 
responsibilities at parochial schools, eventually concluding that applying the National Labor 
Relations Act to religious schools would lead to entanglement under the Establishment Clause.103  
Analyzing the “nature of the functions performed by the employees in determining whether an 
exemption was applicable” was deemed necessary by that Court.104   
                                                 
99 Id. (quoting Bruce Bagli, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by 
Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1539-40 (1984)). 
100 EVANS, supra note 12, at 128. 
101 Id. at 128-29 (explaining that the Supreme Court held that the threshold question of “whether an activity of  
church is a religious activity” would be left to the religious institution itself to decide, in order to keep courts from 
“second guessing religious doctrine concerning its ministry”). 
102 Karen Crupi, Comment, The Relationship Between Title VII and the First Amendment Religion Clauses: The 
Unconstitutional Schism of Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 53 ALB. L. REV. 421, 435 (1989). 
103 Crupi, supra note 102, at 471-72 (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)).   
104 Id. 
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 Furthermore, Crupi argues that by granting the exemption to religious nonprofit 
employers, the Court advanced “economically dependent and more established religious sects 
over others.”105  This creates an unconstitutional effect under Lemon because it denies 
government neutrality toward all religious organizations.  She suggests that the Amos Court 
assumed that religious entities that are structured as nonprofits would inherently be religious in 
nature, thereby not requiring an inquiry into their secular and religious activities.106  Crupi 
claims, however that “nonprofit” and “religious” are not synonymous.107  She claims that Amos’s 
distinction based wholly upon nonprofit structure was “overinclusive” and insulated nonprofit 
organizations’ purely secular employment activities that otherwise did not warrant First 
Amendment protection; she likewise argues that they are “underinclusive” because the 
employment relationship of for-profit religious organizations performing primarily religious 
functions is not given similar protection.  She ultimately argues that courts must examine the 
nature of the employment relationship in order to determine whether Title VII may apply.    
IV.  FEDERAL EXEMPTION FOR NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 
 A critical aspect of Justice Brennan and Justice O’Connor’s concurrences in Amos, and 
the aspect of the case with which this paper takes issue, is the nonprofit character of the activities 
that are exempt from Title VII’s mandates under Amos.  This section describes varying 
definitions and categories of nonprofit entities and the role they have in the federal tax code.  
A.  The Hansmann Model of Nonprofit Entities: “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise”   
 Nonprofit corporations have a defined, growing role in our nation’s economy.  Professor 
Hansmann’s 1980 article in the Yale Law Journal, “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,”108 
                                                 
105 Id. at 469. 
106 Id. at 470. 
107 Id. 
108 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980). 
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provides an overview of the economic role of nonprofit organizations, specifically focusing on 
corporations that produce goods and services, or “operating” nonprofits, including “colleges, 
hospitals, day care centers, nursing homes, research institutes, publications, symphony 
orchestras, social clubs, trade associations, labor unions, churches, and organizations for the 
relief of the needy and distressed.”109  
 According to Hansmann, a nonprofit organization is one that is “barred from distributing 
its net earnings [profits], if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, 
officers, directors, or trustees.”110  If the organization is incorporated, the main distinction 
between such corporations and their for-profit counterparts is, again, the nondistribution of 
earnings.111  Some states have added to this requirement, or replaced it with a statement that the 
organization may not be formed or operated for the “purpose of pecuniary gain,” which, although 
usually read as meaning the same thing as the nondistribution of earnings, has also been 
interpreted to mean that an “organization may not be incorporated as a nonprofit even if it is 
intended to assist in the pecuniary gain in a more indirect manner.”112 
 Hansmann breaks down nonprofit corporations into several categories.  He calls 
nonprofits that receive most or all of their income from grants or donations “donative” 
nonprofits; he places organizations formed to provide relief to the needy in this category,113 so 
religious institutions that provide such services would fall into this classification.  He then deems 
nonprofits that receive most of their income from prices charged for their services “commercial 
nonprofits”—thus, nursing homes and hospitals often fall into this category.  He also explains 
                                                 
109 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 837 (1980). 
110 Id. at 838.  Hansmann notes that many nonprofit organizations actually show regular annual accounting 
surpluses.  Id.    
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 839.    
113 Id. at 840. 
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that nonprofits that are controlled by their patrons are “mutual” nonprofits, whereas nonprofit 
organizations that are primarily free from the formal control of their patrons are 
“entrepreneurial” nonprofits.114  He then presents four resulting categories: donative mutual; 
donative entrepreneurial; commercial mutual; and commercial entrepreneurial.115        
 Hansmann suggests that nonprofit firms might be slower to meet increased demand and 
might be less efficient in their use of inputs than for-profit firms are; he also points out that 
nonprofits may still succeed in distributing some of their net earnings (even though they 
technically should not) through inflated salaries, perquisites granted to employees, and other 
excess payments).  In the case of donative nonprofit corporations, specifically the organizations 
that provide relief to the needy, using a nonprofit rather than a for-profit works because the 
purchasers, that is, the individuals who pay for the corporation to provide services to the needy, 
have no connection to the recipients of the goods or services.  The purchasers thus cannot readily 
know whether the services they pay for are ever performed or performed adequately; if the 
corporation providing such goods and services were for-profit, “it would have a strong incentive 
to skimp on the services it promises, or even to neglect to perform them entirely, and, instead, to 
divert most or all of its revenues directly to its owners.”116  Therefore, the nonprofit corporation, 
by its very structure, is better equipped to actually serve the less fortunate.  However, Hansmann 
is quick to point out that nonprofits do not always need to be utilized in the context of a person 
(the purchaser) subsidizing another’s (the recipient) consumption.117  It is only when the donor or 
                                                 
114 Id. at 841.   
115 Id. at 842. 
116 Id. at 847. 
117 Id.  Hansmann explains that, for example, in the context of goods (rather than services), donors have the option of 
taking delivery of the goods him or herself, ensuring that the producer has sufficiently performed and sending the 
goods to the donee.  A for-profit producer can also make delivery directly to the donee (i.e., with florist shops, the 
donor is likely to hear from the recipient about the qualify of service, so there is “limited opportunity for abuse on 
the part of the florists”).  Additionally, for-profit producers are often used in subsidizing demand rather than supply, 
as in the case of redeemable coupons like food stamps or housing vouchers (government subsidy schemes), or gift 
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purchaser cannot contact the donee or recipient directly in order to ensure adequate performance, 
but must rely on the producer of the subsidized good or service as the point of contact, that 
Hansmann believes that a nonprofit enterprise should be utilized.118         
B.  The Internal Revenue Code Provides Key Insights into the Nonprofit Structure   
 Religious institutions are exempt from federal income taxation if they qualify as 
“nonprofit” corporations under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.): 
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, 
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur 
sports competition . . ., or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no 
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder 
or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, . . . and which does 
not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of 
statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public 
office.119 
 
Therefore, not all nonprofit organizations are exempt from taxation.120  However, the “definition 
of the categories of nonprofits that qualify for exemption has followed the expansion of 
nonprofits into new fields, rather than vice versa,” meaning that the Tax Code has been amended 
and reinterpreted to include new forms of nonprofits as nonprofit enterprises expand their 
                                                                                                                                                             
certificates (private subsidy schemes); the donee or recipient is the one who polices the for-profit producers.  Id. at 
848.  These are all examples in which for-profit corporations can work in subsidy/charity cases.       
118 Id. at 848. 
119 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986).   
120 See Hansmann, supra note 109, at 881 n.107.  Organizations that qualify for the exemption must meet the 
following definition: 
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international 
amateur sports competition . . ., or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of 
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is 
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, . . . and which does not participate in, or 
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any 
candidate for public office.  Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)). 
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activities.121  These exemptions give nonprofit organizations competitive advantages over their 
for-profit counterparts, which has an effect on nonprofit firm development.122    
 Under the charitable deduction provision of the Internal Revenue Code, an individual 
who contributes money to a nonprofit organization that falls within a class defined by the I.R.C. 
(a subset of the class of nonprofit entities that qualify for exemption from the corporate income 
tax)123 can deduct the donation from his or her income;124 this provision does assist nonprofits 
that qualify for it.  Hansmann argues, however, that charitable deductions have affected the 
“overall scale of nonprofit activity,” rather than the actual distribution of nonprofit activity 
across specific services or sectors.   
 If a nonprofit organization meets the following requirements, it is considered nonprofit 
for purposes of exemption: (1) the organization must be organized and operated exclusively for 
religious purposes; (2) no part of the organization’s net earnings may go towards the benefit of 
any private shareholder or individual; and (3) the organization must not engage in “substantial 
lobbying activities” or intervene in political campaigns.125  The first criterion, as discussed 
above, is difficult because it is not always clear what a “religious” purpose is.  “Churches” are 
also exempt from the Internal Revenue Service’s (I.R.S.) normal requirement that tax-exempt 
organizations must file a statement of activities and informational tax return, justifying their 
                                                 
121 Hansmann, supra note 109, at 882.        
122 Id. at 883.  This effect still might not be important in determining the specific industries in which development 
takes place.  Id.  Hansmann suggests that a tax exemption does not appear to be the deciding factor for organizers of 
a certain activity when they must choose whether to organize under a nonprofit or for-profit model.  Id. at 882-83.  
However, he points out that exemption from property taxes probably is more significant or helpful to these 
organizations than is exemption from the corporate income tax.  Id. at 882.         
123 I.R.C. § 170.   
124 Id.; see also Hansmann, supra note 109, at 883-84 (explaining that, as in the case of the effect of the exemption 
from the corporate tax, the charitable deduction provision has also been reinterpreted and revised to coincide with 
the expansion of nonprofit activity into different arenas; explaining also that the availability of this deduction has not 
been necessary for the development of donative nonprofits, since qualifying organizations cannot always solicit 
meaningful donations).   
125 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3).   
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status.126  This lack of oversight over “churches” and other religious organizations has presented 
tax fraud issues, as “bogus churches” have organized under § 501(c)(3) to avoid taxation.127  
However, the I.R.S.’s fear of infringing on the autonomy of legitimate institutions has made it 
hesitate to prosecute fraud, thus widening the scope of protection for religious institutions.    
 Scott McClure also provides the following explanation of the distinction between for-
profit and nonprofits: “for-profits can distribute their profits for general use by the church, while 
nonprofit entities must utilize their earnings to finance the continued operation of the enterprise 
itself.128  Providing an exemption to for-profit corporations would violate the second prong of 
Lemon because it “permits religious organizations to pursue activities that are unconnected to the 
mission of the church—activities aimed solely at generating profit.”129  He also analyzed this 
question under the third Lemon prong (that the law must avoid excessive entanglement with 
religion), looking into the nature of the benefited institutions, the nature of the aid provided, and 
the relationship between the government and the religious organization.  If Congress or the 
courts provided an exemption to for-profits, it would require a case-by-case analysis of whether 
an activity is secular or religious (to determine what activities were connected to the religious 
mission and what activities were engaged in purely for a profit motive).130  In McClure’s 
opinion, this kind of case-by-case analysis brings on unwarranted government scrutiny and 
entanglement, the kind the Court abhorred in Amos.131 
                                                 
126 EVANS, supra note 12, at 140 (pointing out that the definition of a “church” is also problematic because the 
Department of the Treasury’s definition is simply a “religious order or a religious organization if such order or 
organization (a) is an integral part of a church, and (b) is engaged in carrying out the functions of a church” (quoting 
Treasury Regulation § 1.511–2(a)(3)(ii)). 
127 EVANS, supra note 12, at 141. 
128 McClure, supra note 46 (citing Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprises, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980)). 
129 McClure, supra note 46, at 601. 
130 Id. at 602.  McClure explains that an examination of whether a for-profit’s activity is religious or secular would 
apply in the case of a non-categorical exemption for for-profits.  Id. 
131 Id.  
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 Under the Free Exercise Clause, McClure suggests that a “blanket exemption of for-profit 
enterprises operated by religious institutions . . . poses the danger of infringing upon personal 
religious beliefs in which no countervailing state interests exists in allowing religious 
organizations to freely practice their own religion,” notwithstanding the offense to employees’ 
Free Exercise rights that a categorical exemption poses.132  Ultimately, McClure advocates for a 
case-by-case application of the § 702 exemption to for-profits:  
Only as to religious activities would a provision that allows the exercise of 
religious preferences remove a regulation that burdens the free exercise of 
religion.  This rationale supports the application of section 702 only to those 
secular enterprises—both nonprofit and for-profit—that a religious organization 
can show are religious in nature and vital to the church’s religious mission. . . . A 
categorical denial of the exemption to all for-profits would violate an 
organization’s right to freely exercise its religion.  However, a categorical 
exemption infringes on the free-exercise rights of employees.  This infringement 
can be justified only when the state provides a compelling countervailing interest 
in promoting the free exercise of religious belief by the religious employer. . . .133  
 
McClure acknowledges that a case-by-case analysis under the Free Exercise Clause should not 
necessarily apply to all of religious entity’s secular activities, both nonprofit and for-profit; this 
is because, again, such an inquiry poses excessive entanglement and the chilling of religious 
activity; he explains, however, that these dangers of analyzing the organization’s activities are 
“of less concern with regard to for-profits . . . since for-profit status alone casts doubt on whether 
the activity has religious content.”134  McClure suggests that the third part of the Free Exercise 
test, which looks at the extent to which a statute’s objectives are impeded, would not be violated 
by a case-by-case approach.  Ultimate, McClure argues that a case-by-case “application of the 
                                                 
132 Id. at 603.   
133 Id. at 604. 
134 Id. at 605 (suggesting that it is reasonable to require a religious institution to prove that its “profit-seeking 
ventures relate to its religious mission,” and that a “case-by-case approach best responds to these dangers by 
balancing the requirements of the religion clauses”).   
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exemption to those for-profits that can show that they are religious in nature best balances the 
requirements of the religion clauses.”135    
V.  REVISITING AMOS AND CLARIFYING THE DEFINITION OF NONPROFIT ACTIVITY 
 The U.S. Supreme Court should revisit its holding in Amos and clarify its test of what 
constitutes a nonprofit activity.  Although the Court expressed concern in the opinion about 
making case-by-case distinctions between the religious and secular activities of religious 
employers, the Court needs a more precise definition of nonprofit activity, and should thus 
require that courts engage in a case-by-case determination of whether a particular entity’s 
activities meet that definition, in order to ensure that as little discrimination as possible is 
occurring in the workplace.  Although the Court said that it did not want to risk the chilling 
effect that inquiring into the religious or secular activities of religious employers might cause, it 
is important that the exemption for religious organizations not be unnecessarily broad.   
A.  The Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act Warrants Rethinking the Amos Holding  
 As the legislative history shows, Title VII was enacted to correct the problems with 
discrimination in the workplace.136  Although race and sex discrimination had posed many of the 
problems leading to the passage of Title VII, Congress was concerned with all forms of 
discrimination, and discrimination against employees or potential employees on religious 
grounds should be treated with as much suspicion as the other protected categories in Title VII 
are.137  It is interesting that the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunities Act was passed with the 
                                                 
135 Id. at 606.  McClure argues that such a case-by-case approach poses the “comparatively minimal dangers of 
slight governmental entanglement in religion and a decrease in the free exercise rights of religious institutions.”  Id. 
136 See supra Part II.A; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (“The emphasis of 
both the language and the legislative history of the statute is on eliminating discrimination in employment; similarly 
situated employees are not to be treated differently solely because they differ with respect to race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.” (citation omitted)).    
137 Testimony of Rep. Brown, H.R. 92-238 (92d Congress, 1st Sess.), Equal Employment Opportunities 
Enforcement Act of 1971, to accompany H.R. 1746, at 70 (June 2, 1971).  See also EEOC Policy Statement, 
Religious Organization Exemption Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended (effective date Sept. 
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intention of strengthening the EEOC’s enforcement power to enact the provisions of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act—that Congress wanted the EEOC to have more oversight and ability to 
investigate and prosecute Title VII actions.  The debate on the floor indicates how important it 
was to some senators that removal of discrimination in the workplace actually be carried out, and 
not just remain a lofty goal.  Senator Hawkins called for a “reaffirmation of our national policy 
of equal opportunity in employment.”138  Improving the employment opportunities of all 
Americans in all aspects of their jobs was clearly one of Congress’s goals.   
 And it was quite clear that some senators opposed the liberal new expansion of § 702 for 
religious organizations.  Senator Williams, for example, believed that religious institutions 
should be the frontrunner in leading the charge against workplace discrimination—that they, of 
all employers, should not perpetuate and facilitate unreasonable discrimination.139  Not everyone 
in Congress supported even allowing any exemption at all.  The EEOC Policy Statement issued 
after Amos also indicates the Commission strongly disagreed with such a broad exemption from 
anti-discrimination laws, and that it was important not to lose sight of the original purpose of 
Title VII.140  Regardless of the amount of support for that provision, however, it still exists and is 
not likely to be removed any time soon.  As a matter of public policy, however, the Supreme 
Court should not allow the § 702 exemption to swallow any chance employees performing 
secular functions for religious employers have of keeping their jobs without compromising their 
own religious beliefs.  The Court would then act consistently with the real intent of Title VII and 
                                                                                                                                                             
23, 1987, expiration date Mar. 23, 1988), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religious_orgs_exemption.html (declaring the EEOC’s position that religious 
organizations and religious educational institutions should not be exempt from liability under Title VII for 
discrimination in employment on religious grounds).  See also JEFFREY M. BERNBACH, JOB DISCRIMINATION: HOW 
TO FIGHT AND HOW TO WIN 116 (1996) “Under the law, one’s religious beliefs are accorded the same protection as 
one’s age, race, sex, national origin, or disability.  Thus, they may not be held up to ridicule in the workplace (nor, 
for that matter, anyplace.”) (emphasis in original). 
138 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (providing excerpt of Senator Hawkins’s testimony).   
139 See supra note 56 and accompanying test (providing excerpt of Senator Williams’s testimony). 
140 See supra Part III.C. 
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would protect workers from discrimination if it was not absolutely necessary for legitimate 
nonprofit institutions.   
 It is evident that Congress chose to treat religion differently than other protected 
characteristics under Title VII: race, color, gender, and national origin.  However, Congress still 
did not allow religious organizations to discriminate on any other basis except religion.  They 
cannot, for example, discriminate on the basis of race or sex, even if an organization would be 
morally opposed to hiring someone because of that person’s gender or race.141  Since Congress 
has not chosen to give religious organizations free reign over their hiring decisions, it is 
appropriate that an organization’s right to discriminate on religious grounds be circumscribed.   
B.  Wholly Exempting Religious Organizations from Title VII Could be Unconstitutional 
 There are some who conclude that exempting religious organizations from any statutes of 
general applicability is unconstitutional, which should lead to a rethinking of which types of 
nonprofit activities should actually be exempt.  Ira Lupu concludes that giving religious 
organizations any exemption from federal statutes of general applicability violates the 
Establishment Clause, indicating that even exempting the nonprofit activities of religious 
organizations is constitutionally suspect.142  He argues that the Free Exercise Clause was put into 
place to protect individual religious freedom, and that exemptions might actually be forbidden 
under the Establishment Clause.143  Thus, if exemptions are to be granted (and it is unlikely that 
the Supreme Court will overturn its precedent upholding the § 702 exemption as applied to 
secular activities of a religious nonprofit organization), they must be narrowly tailored.        
                                                 
141 See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 28, at 422. 
142 Id. at 401.   
143 Id. 
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 Steven Gey actually argues that it does not make sense, for exemption purposes, to 
distinguish between the for-profit and nonprofit entities that are both owned by bona fide 
religious organizations:  
[I]f the owner is a bona fide religious organization, it will probably use the profits 
obtained from its for-profit corporations to further its own activities, most of 
which will be religious.  If the ultimate use of the money produced by a 
commercial enterprise is religions in nature, then the corporate nature of the 
enterprise should not matter.  There is no reason to give constitutional preference 
to a nonprofit gymnasium whose earnings may be used to finance additional 
weightlifting equipment, as opposed to a for-profit gymnasium whose earnings 
may be used to buy additional hymnals.144 
 
Thus, he believes that singling out nonprofit entities for the exemption might not even be 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause.  Congress would be doing more than 
accommodating—it would be giving “constitutional preference” to nonprofit entities.   
C.  Courts Must Look for a More Precise Definition in Order to Avoid Windfalls for  
      Religious Organizations 
  
 Alan Brownstein suggests that nonprofit religious entities are able to offer “less costly, 
more competitive, more efficient, and more cohesive services than their secular competitors.”145  
Thus, religious nonprofit entities have an advantage over their secular counterparts because they 
can hire or fire based on religion, without regard to the mandates of Title VII, allowing them to 
conserve economic resources in ways that secular employers cannot.146  Thus, any exemptions 
made for such organizations should be narrowly tailored.   
                                                 
144 Gey, supra note 25, at 93.  Gey argues that the real significance of Amos is not “whether a commercial enterprise 
spends its money for religious purposes,” but “whether a secular adjunct of a religious organization can assert a 
constitutional interest sufficient to justify discrimination.”  Id. at 93.    
145 Brownstein, supra note 21, at 131 (noting that an exemption having “force as an inducement does not necessarily 
require that a court reject it [because] the power of an exemption to induce religious belief and practice should be 
part of the balancing analysis a court undertakes in adjudicating a free exercise claim,” id. at 132). 
146 See, e.g., Catholic Charities v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).  The California Supreme Court interpreted 
this as a case that “implicate[d] the relationship between a nonprofit public benefit corporation and its employees, 
most of whom do not belong to the Catholic Church.  Only those who join a church impliedly consent to its religious 
governance on matters of faith and discipline.”  Id. at 77.  Thus, courts have not always upheld exemptions for 
religious entities.   
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 In addition, Brownstein suggests that allowing such exemptions, particularly when they 
are legislatively mandated, might tacitly require employees to espouse or adopt the religious 
beliefs of their employers so as to retain job security.147  Such a development would inherently 
infringe the Free Exercise rights of employees of religious organizations because they would 
either adopt certain practices at work that are consistent with their employer’s beliefs, or they 
would fail to disclose their own religious beliefs for fear of being fired.  Creating an environment 
in which employees feel constrained to adopt religious beliefs or practices contrary to their own 
is fundamentally opposed to the anti-discrimination framework of Title VII,148 so the Supreme 
Court should carefully circumscribe its decision to exempt both the religious and secular 
activities of nonprofit religious organizations.  In a similar vein, religious organizations will be 
able to exercise dominance or even oppression if granted an exemption that is too broad in scope.  
Ira Lupu argues that, “[Granting] such exemptions would enable dominant groups to gain rights 
unavailable to others, thus threatening the principle of equal religious liberty.”149  Religious 
entities, therefore, are gaining a windfall when they are exempt from having to show that they 
invoked the § 702 exemption only for employment activities related to their religious mission.  
 Organizations might also exert sham claims purporting to be religious or nonprofit in 
nature in order to gain the opportunity to discriminate under the § 702 exemption.  This would 
again provide a windfall that Congress could not have intended when it enacted the exemption.  
Justice Brennan acknowledged in Amos, albeit in a footnote, that “if experience proved that 
nonprofit incorporation was frequently used simply to evade Title VII, I would find it necessary 
                                                 
147 Id.  Note, however, that Brownstein ultimately argues that courts and legislatures should give high deference to 
the freedom of religious employers under Establishment Clause grounds.  
148 See supra discussion Part II.   
149 Lupu, supra note 28, at 422. 
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to reconsider the judgment in these cases.”150  There could be instances, therefore, where such a 
categorical exemption for nonprofit religious organizations would be inappropriate, even if the 
Excessive Entanglement doctrine151 (the third prong of Lemon) and the “secular legislative 
purpose” requirement (the first prong of Lemon)152 had prompted the Court not to inquire into 
whether activities went towards a religious mission.  Thus, the deference shown under Amos is 
not absolute, and the Court would clearly be willing to limit the reach of its exemption if sham 
claims cropped up.  Although there has not been widespread evidence that organizations have 
claimed to be religious or nonprofit in nature just to reap the benefits of § 702, there is always a 
possibility, as Alan Brownstein acknowledges, that some organizations would purport to abuse 
the legislative exemption.153  The Court should not be opposed to circumscribing the ability of 
religious organizations to discriminate in their hiring practices, in order to avoid the possibility 
of shams in the first place. 
 Sham claims might be widespread in other religious exemption contexts, however, and 
courts appear to have prevented entities that are making the claims from receiving an exemption.  
The charitable choice provisions of President Bush’s faith-based initiatives, for example, 
exempted faith-based employers from laws prohibiting religious discrimination in employment 
                                                 
150  Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 344 n.4 
(1987).  Justice Brennan did not cite any examples of “shamming” actually occurring in this context, but his 
acknowledgement that it might happen indicates that the decision to grant such a widespread exemption could be 
curtailed under the right circumstances.  
151 Id. at 339 (“It cannot be seriously contended that § 702 impermissibly entangles church and state; the statute 
effectuates a more complete separation of the two and avoids the kind of intrusive inquiry into religious belief that 
the District Court engaged in in this case.   The statute easily passes muster under the third part of the Lemon test.”).       
152 Id. at 334-35 (“Rather, Lemon’s ‘purpose’ requirement aims at preventing the relevant governmental 
decisionmaker—in this case, Congress—from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of protecting a 
particular point of view in religious matters.  Under the Lemon analysis, it is a permissive legislative purpose to 
alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their 
religious missions.”).   
153 Brownstein, supra note 21, at 133-34.  Brownstein argues, however, that fears of sham claims are more prevalent 
than they need to be, since organizations actually do not have real incentives to assert such claims.  Should an 
organization invoke a religious exemption, it might also become ineligible for government subsidies, and there could 
be conditions attached to the exemption that outweigh the benefits.  Id.; see also infra Part I.B.   
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practices; this was taken wholesale from Title VII.154  Rampant discrimination has not persisted, 
however.  Rather, “there are numerous cases where courts have decided against an FBO’s [faith-
based organization] claim that employment decisions were central to their religious function and 
ruled that the claim merely was a sham and could not qualify for the Title VII exemption.”155  
Thus, sham claims could be more pervasive than has been acknowledged, but the courts have 
stifled most of them.  However, this does not mean that such claims could not become more 
widespread or that courts, in the name of religious toleration and avoidance of entanglement, will 
be unable or unwilling to examine more closely whether a claim seems to be a sham.  Ensuring 
that organizations that meet the definition of “nonprofit” receive the benefits of the exemption 
will avoid the problems of fraud and help to effectuate Congress’s true intent.  As Karen Crupi 
also points out, the Supreme Court has always inquired into the religious or secular nature of 
activities, so it would not be inappropriate or anomalous for the Court to do the same in this 
case.156  Determining whether an organization is therefore nonprofit or for-profit, according to a 
definition developed by the Court, would hardly be inappropriate interference or “excessive 
entanglement.” 
 Of course, the Supreme Court has not varied from the decision that Amos applies to 
nonprofit religious entities, indicating that a categorical exemption for nonprofit entities meant 
                                                 
154 John Farina, A Hidden Agenda Drives Liberal Opposition to Charitable Choice—Race and Gender 
Discrimination Publicity—Brief Article, BNET BUSINESS NETWORK, Feb. 26, 2001, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_8_17/ai_72274918; see also Solomon v. Miami Women’s Club, 359 
F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D. Fla. Miami Div. 1973) (although not a religious organization receiving the § 702 exemption, a 
women’s club was held not to be a mere sham to avoid the Civil Rights Act).    
155 Farina, supra note 154 (arguing that, “There are no cases where the ministerial exemption has been used 
successfully to defend discrimination in charitable choice programs.  The framers of the religious exemption to the 
Civil Rights Act were not about to allow racial and sex discrimination in through the back door after they had 
labored so vigorously for the sweeping social reform embodied in that 1964 legislation.”).    
156 Crupi, supra note 102, at 435.   
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something to the Court.157  The Supreme Court is not likely to overturn Amos, a twenty-year-old 
decision, and declare that the § 702 exemption is unconstitutional.  The Court treads on narrow 
ground, however, by not allowing at least for case-by-case determinations of what constitutes 
nonprofit activity.  If the Court were to clarify this aspect of its holding in Amos, it would still 
protect the rights of religious organizations engaging in nonprofit activities to make employment 
decisions based on religious grounds, but it would not further frustrate the original purpose of 
Title VII and allow religious organizations to discriminate unnecessarily or unjustifiably.   
C.  Searching for a Definition of “Nonprofit” Among Various Sources  
 A number of sources must be explored in order to ascertain an appropriate definition of 
“nonprofit,” or at least what the Supreme Court might have had in mind when it determined that 
only the nonprofit secular activities of a religious organization would be exempt under § 702. 
 1.  Lower Courts Interpreting Amos Have Not Provided a Definition   
 Lower courts have accepted Amos’s requirement that nonprofit activities are exempt, but 
they have not analyzed what religious entities actually qualify for nonprofit status under Amos, 
indicating that more religious entities than are necessary might be coming under the radar and 
qualifying for exemption from generally applicable mandates.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
                                                 
157 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 710 (2005) (citing Amos for the proposition that accommodations to 
religious entities do not need to be accompanied by benefits to secular organizations or entities); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (upholding the “benevolent neutrality” principle as recognized in Amos); Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 684 n.3 (2005) (citing Amos for the principle that the Establishment Clause does not bar “any 
and all governmental preference for religion over irreligion”).  See also Supreme Court Declines Case About What 
Makes an Employer “Religious”, THE ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION & SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY, 
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/news/article.cfm?id=8162 (Apr. 22, 2008).  The Supreme Court declined to 
grant certiorari in a case appealed out of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, LeBoon v. Lancaster 
Jewish Community Association, No. 07-943 (Apr. 21, 2008).  The issue was whether the Jewish Community Center 
could be sued for firing an evangelical Christian employee.  The Third Circuit had held that it could not be sued 
because it was a religious entity under Title VII, and not merely a cultural organization.  Id.  This paper is not 
addressing the concept of what constitutes a “religious organization” for purposes of Title VII, but the Supreme 
Court’s decision not to hear the petition indicates that it agreed that the Center was a religious institution.  Thus, the 
Court is still adhering to its precedent in terms of what types of institutions qualify for the § 702 exemption.   
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Seventh Circuit, in Cohen v. Des Plaines,158 determined that the church-operated nursery schools 
and day care centers in the case had to be operated on a not-for-profit basis, in order for these 
entities to be exempt from a city zoning requirement that day care centers and nursery schools 
obtain special use permits to operate in residential areas.159  The court did not address what 
“nonprofit” meant, but it clearly felt that this part of Amos was important enough that activities 
could only qualify for an exemption from the special use permit if they were nonprofit.160     
 Likewise, in E.E.O.C. v. Townley Engineering and Manufacturing Co.,161 the Ninth 
Circuit stated that “Congress may create a bright line rule and exempt from regulation all of the 
nonprofit activity of religious corporations.”162  The court did not address the meaning of 
“nonprofit,” but it clearly recognized that only nonprofit activities qualified for an exemption, 
indicating that it is important to know exactly what “nonprofit” entails.  The court also held that 
it was necessary to examine on a case-by-case basis whether a corporation’s purpose and 
character were primarily religious, such that the corporation would qualify for the § 702 
exemption.163   
 Thus, courts are willing to engage in case-by-case determinations of whether an entity is 
primarily religious or secular; it is not too much of a stretch, therefore, to require that they 
examine on a case-by-case basis whether an entity’s activities qualify as nonprofit or not.   
 2.  The Concurrences in Amos (and the Internal Revenue Code) Provide Insight  
                                                 
158 8 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1993).  
159 Id. at 493 (quoting extensively from Justice Brennan’s and O’Connor’s concurrences in Amos).   
160 Id. (quoting Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987))).   
161 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).  
162 Id. at 623.   
163 Id. at 618 (“All significant religious and secular characteristics must be weighed to determine whether the corporation’s 
purpose and character are primarily religious.  Only when that is the case will the corporation be able to avail itself of the 
exemption.”).  
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 It is essential to cull any meaning for nonprofit activity from Justice Brennan’s and 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrences, since both justices acknowledged that the distinction between  
nonprofit and for-profit was critical to the exemption in Amos.  As Justice Brennan explained, a 
non-profit entity must “utilize its earnings to finance the continued provision of the goods or 
services it furnishes, and may not distribute any surplus to the owners.”164  This appears to also 
be the definition taken from § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,165 and could be a 
potential starting point for what the Court considers to be “nonprofit activity.”  The fact that 
Justice Brennan also noted that in footnote 4 of his concurrence that he would have to reconsider 
his opinions if it could be shown that “nonprofit incorporation” was used to evade Title VII166 
might indicate that Justice Brennan was referring to incorporation under § 501(c)(3). 
 Under the Internal Revenue Code, if an organization that meets the definition of 
“nonprofit” meets certain requirements, it receives an exemption under § 501(c)(3).  These 
criteria are (1) the organization must be organized and operated exclusively for religious 
purposes; (2) no part of the organization’s net earnings may go towards the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual; and (3) the organization must not engage in “substantial lobbying 
                                                 
164 Id. (stating that this explanation of a nonprofit corporation “makes plausible a church’s contention that an entity 
is not operated simply in order to generate revenues for the church, but that the activities themselves are infused 
with a religious purpose”).  See also Associated Contract Loggers, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 84 F. Supp. 
2d 1029, 1034 (D. Minn. 2000).  In this case, involving the First Amendment right to petition for redress of 
grievances, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota decided that even if the nonprofit defendants were 
advocates of a religion’s precepts, there was “no support for the proposition that the right to petition is restricted to 
citizens whose motivation is only secular.”  Id. at 1034.  Thus, courts have shown their support for the rights of both 
religious and secular organizations.  The court here did not specifically define “nonprofit” as applied to the 
defendant environmental groups, but it also did not consider these nonprofit groups to be so entangled with the 
United States Forest Service as to be state actors.  Thus, “nonprofit” actors could take a variety of forms, whether 
religious or secular, and the government could potentially be excessively entangled with them in violation of the 
First Amendment.  Knowing whether “nonprofit” requires that the organization be organized for a specific purpose 
and whether it can have any kind of religious mission would be critical to knowing whether it could be excessively 
entangled (and thus violate the Lemon test and not qualify for the Title VII exemption).     
165 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (“Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively 
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes . . . no part of the net earnings of 
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual . . . .”). 
166 Amos, 483 U.S. at 344 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).  Justice Brennan did not, however, explain what 
he meant by “nonprofit incorporation,” but his concurrence at least brings up the importance of the issue, which was 
something the majority did not consider.     
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activities” or intervene in political campaigns.167  The Supreme Court could logically incorporate 
these requirements into its standards for the types of nonprofit entities would receive an 
exemption from Title VII, since the § 501(c)(3) is a “classic” exemption from federal laws for 
religious organizations.  Of course, there would have to be specified levels of proof or 
evidentiary requirements for showing that an organization is being operated for religious 
purposes, not allowing its earnings to go to the shareholders or members, and not engaging in 
political or lobbying activities.  The last requirement has become a prevalent issue as religious 
organizations have increasingly spoken out on certain political issues, and as there has been 
confusion over what constitutes “substantial lobbying activities.”168 
 Justice Brennan also pointed out that nonprofit activities must be used for community 
service activities, and not merely for commercial purposes.169  It would be helpful to know to 
what extent an activity that qualifies for the § 702 exemption has to be for a community service 
purpose, or to what extent such an activity could be “commercial” (or even what “commercial” 
means in this context).  As Gey points out, some religious organizations’ nonprofit activities 
might not actually be related to their “religious” mission; money raised by nonprofit activities at 
the Mormon gymnasium in Amos could have gone to finance more weightlifting equipment, 
whereas a for-profit religious institution could use its profits to buy more hymnals—which 
clearly do go toward a church’s religious mission.  The Amos Court did not clarify what kinds of 
activities a nonprofit entity must fund or support in order to receive the Title VII exemption, but 
the Court did hold that it would not inquire into the religious and secular activities of nonprofit 
                                                 
167 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) (1986); see also supra Part IV.B.     
168 See, e.g., Politics and the Pulpit 2008: IRS Restrictions on Political Intervention and Lobbying, THE PEW FORUM 
ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=281 (last visited May 7, 2008); The History of 
Church Electioneering, OMB Watch, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/2852/1/41?TopicID=2 (last 
visited May 7, 2008); Sidley Austin LLP, Religious Institutions Law Alert, FINDLAW, 
http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Aug/1/128574.html (last visited May 7, 2008).   
169 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 344 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., concurring).   
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religious organizations.  Thus, secular activities fall within the § 702 exemption.  The scope of 
“nonprofit” must not sweep too broadly, however.  For example, the Court could clarify its 
definition by revisiting Justice Brennan’s concurrence and require, for example, that only 
nonprofit activities that relate to or have a “community service” purpose or some other specific 
charitable purpose be exempt.       
 Justice Brennan believed that because the nonprofit activities of religious organizations 
would present the most problems in determining whether an activity is religious or secular, this 
justified a categorical rule.170  It seems, however, that these are the cases where the Court would 
need to examine the activities more closely, on a case-by-case basis.  Courts at least need to 
examine on a case-by-case basis whether an organization’s activities could be characterized as 
“nonprofit,” before it can make the sweeping decision that the characterization that the activities 
are religious or secular does not need to be made.  Justice O’Connor, likewise, argued that the 
nonprofit nature of an activity justified a categorical rule: “Because there is a probability that a 
nonprofit activity of a religious organization will itself be involved in the organization’s religious 
mission, . . . the objective observer should perceive the Government action as an accommodation 
of the exercise of religion rather than as a Government endorsement of religion.”171  In order to 
determine whether the “nonprofit activity” would actually be part of the organization’s “religious 
mission,” however, it seems necessary to know what the Court actually deems “nonprofit,” again 
before any sweeping generalizations can be made about the nature of nonprofit activities.  Even 
Justice O’Connor’s statement that nonprofit activities are likely to be part of the religious 
organization’s religious mission could be too broad of a statement, as religious organizations 
might conduct nonprofit activities for the sake of conducting the activities, without actually tying 
                                                 
170 Amos, 483 U.S. at 345 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., concurring); see also discussion supra Part III.B. 
171 Id. at 349 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
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a religious meaning or message to those activities.172  As Karen Crupi argues, “nonprofit” and 
“religious” are not synonymous, and exempting all of a religious organization’s insulates 
nonprofit organizations’ secular employment activities that should not actually receive First 
Amendment protection.173 
 3.  Searching for a Definition Among Other Scholarly Sources 
 Various scholars have adopted narrow definitions of “nonprofit” for their academic 
pursuits.  Nobuko Kawashima, for example, in an article on corporate governance for the 
Japanese nonprofit sector, explains that Japanese Nonprofit Organizations are specifically 
incorporated under the Law for the Promotion of Specified Nonprofit Activities for Japan.174  In 
the article, nonprofit activities referred only to “public interest, nonprofit corporations formed 
under state corporation laws, which often have tax privileged status under the Internal Revenue 
Code and can receive tax-deductible donations under the federal tax law.”175  Kawashima also 
acknowledges the “very large number of unincorporated groups and associations that have the 
aim of serving the public interests in Japan,” which are “unincorporated and informal, but to the 
extent that their existence and activities are often known to their local authorities, more active on 
a regular basis than temporary projects.”176  Thus, the author points out the complexity of the 
meaning of “nonprofit,” a meaning that could encompass both incorporated and unincorporated 
entities.  The definition that Kawashima chooses to focus on, however, seems to resonate with 
                                                 
172 Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, 424 F. Supp. 2d 309, 318-19 (D. Mass. 2006) (citations omitted) 
(religious organization’s use of buildings for secular activities or even to generate revenue to support religious 
activities might not be considered “religious exercises”); Elizabeth Ferry, Getting a Head Start on Religious 
Indoctrination: The School Readiness Act of 2005, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 145, 147 (2006) (citing 
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), for the proposition that appropriation by Congress of money to a hospital 
run by Catholic nuns, as compensation for the treatment of poorer patients under a contract with the District of 
Columbia, did not violate the Establishment Clause; the case was about the “incorporation of a hospital for the 
purposes for which such an institution is generally conducted.”  Id. at 297. 
173 Crupi, supra note 102, at 470. 
174 Nobuko Kawashima, Governance of Nonprofit Organizations: Missing Chain of Accountability in Nonprofit 
Corporation Law in Japan and Arguments for Reform in the U.S., 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 81, 85 (2006).   
175 Id.  
176 Id. at 86.  The article focuses exclusively, however, on incorporated organizations. 
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what the Supreme Court might have had in mind in formulating the Amos holding.  Because 
Justice Brennan, for example, referred to nonprofit incorporation in footnote 4 of his 
concurrence,177 it seems as if Amos encapsulates only nonprofit corporate entities—an important 
distinction courts must keep in mind when determining whether an organization should be 
granted the § 702 exemption.  Similarly, the definition that Kawashima adopts—public interest 
corporations that often have tax-exempt status and can receive tax-deductible donations—also 
comports well with the language of Amos, which mentioned nonprofits in the context of the 
Internal Revenue Code in a footnote.178  
 The article contrasts its definition of “nonprofit” with a study of typical characteristics of 
nonprofit entities conducted by researchers at Johns Hopkins University.179  These characteristics 
include independence from government; formality and continuity; that the organization is 
established chiefly by citizens voluntarily; that profits are not divided among members; and self-
governance.180  The Supreme Court certainly could have had these characteristics in mind when 
deciding that only nonprofit entities would receive the exemption because most of these 
characteristics would fit the model of a religious nonprofit entity.  Religious organizations are 
independent from government;181 they are “formal” in nature and are rooted in tradition and 
                                                 
177 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 344 n.4 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).    
178 Id. at 330 n.3.  The Court might also conclude that organizations to which taxpayers can make donations and 
receive a charitable deduction break on their taxes, I.R.C. § 170, would qualify as “nonprofit” under Amos.  See 
Hansmann, supra note 109, at 883-84.     
179 Kawashima, supra note 174, at 85 (citing LESTER M. SALAMON & HELMUT K. ANHEIER, THE EMERGING 
NONPROFIT SECTOR: AN OVERVIEW 1-22 (1996)). 
180 Kawashima, supra note 174, at 85 (citing SALAMON & ANHEIER, supra note 179, at 1-22).   
181 See, e.g., Federick Mark Gedicks, The Improbability of Religion Clause Theory, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233 
(1997) (“Perhaps most importantly, neutrality implies a radically different public role for religion, one unconnected 
to government or to public life, as prescribed by secular individualism.”)  Gedicks quotes the Supreme Court in 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947): “‘Neither a state nor the Federal government can set up a church.  
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.  Neither can force 
nor influence anyone to go or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess belief or disbelief 
in any religion. . . . Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of 
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continuity;182 religious organizations are established primarily by citizens (in the United States, 
they are not established by government entities);183 if they are nonprofit, their profits should not 
be divided among the members, but should go towards the financing and continued distribution 
of goods or services;184 and a feature of religious organization in America is certainly self-
governance—another offshoot of the separation of church and state.185  Thus, the general 
characteristics of nonprofit organizations coincide with the setup of most religious organizations.  
The Amos Court’s blanket statement that all nonprofit activities are exempt might, therefore, 
show that the Court believed that most religious entities, which would likely be formed as 
nonprofit corporations anyway, would be exempt—Justice O’Connor had already made this 
point in her concurrence.186  However, the above characteristics are quite broad in nature, as 
noted by Kawashima, and nonprofit organizations can have narrower definitions or descriptions, 
depending on the context.  In the case of Amos, a definition similar to that provided by 
Kawashima would be appropriate.       
 Professor Hansmann’s exploration of nonprofit entities could also provide a potential 
meaning of “nonprofit” in the § 702 exemption context.  As Hansmann notes, nonprofit entities 
                                                                                                                                                             
any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa.’”  Id. at 15-16.  See also Alan Brownstein, supra note 21, at 
92. 
182 See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 21, at 96 (religion is “grounded in tradition;” it is grounded in “institutions that 
operate over the long term and are less likely to be swayed by the passions of the moment”); see also Frederick 
Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 107-09 
(explaining that the common lives of individuals who are attracted to particular beliefs and experiences will have 
“sufficiently coalesced to enable identification of a community centered on these individuals’ beliefs and 
experiences as core group concerns;” suggesting also that a group’s own narrative is also a way that groups establish 
meaning and authority).   
183 See supra Part I. 
184 See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 344 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).  Churches who operate nonprofit activities often regard these as a way to 
fulfill their religious duties or mission.  Id.   
185 See Gedicks, supra note 182, at 112 (suggesting that religious group existence is threatened in two ways by 
government regulation or intervention: the group might not remain intact, and it is uncertain what kind of group it 
will be if it does remain intact).  See also Michael G. Weisberg, Note, Balancing Cultural Integrity Against 
Individual Liberty: Civil Court Review of Ecclesiastical Judgments, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 955, 964-65 (1992) 
(explaining that religious groups have their own systems of laws and traditions that are extremely complex, 
precluding civil courts from intervening and deciding disputes within a religious organization).   
186 Amos, 483 U.S. at 349 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
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are “barred from distributing [their] net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over 
it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees.”187  Thus, it is clear that any nonprofit entity 
receiving an exemption must truly be “nonprofit,” that is, it cannot distribute any part of its 
earnings to its controlling members or officers.  As Hansmann maintains, no part of a 
corporation’s earnings can go towards the entity’s own pecuniary gain, even in an indirect 
fashion.188  This could actually be problematic for some religious organizations that, for 
example, use part of the earnings from a charity fundraiser to buy holiday gifts for their 
employees (the employees are indirectly reaping the benefits of the earnings from the 
fundraiser).  Thus, the Court would want to specify that under no circumstances could an 
organization’s members benefit, even indirectly, from the nonprofit activities.  This would defeat 
the purpose of the Supreme Court’s intent in Amos, which was to provide an exemption only to 
organizations that are not retaining the benefits of their activities for their own good.189  Of 
course, religious organizations often fulfill their religious mission or duties by providing goods 
and services to others, which technically “benefits” the religious organization’s ultimate aims, 
but the organizations are not rewarded with financial or material gains from the provision of 
goods and services.  
 It would also be helpful to utilize a classification system to clarify which categories or 
types of nonprofit entities would qualify: to borrow Hansmann’s language, only “donative” 
nonprofit entities would probably be exempt.  These are corporations that receive most of their 
income from donations or grants, and they provide services to the needy.190  The Court could 
                                                 
187 Hansmann, supra note 109, at 838. 
188 Id. at 840.  Other ways that a religious employer might benefit its members from the financial gains of its 
nonprofit operations is through inflated salaries, perquisites granted to employees, and other excess payments.  Id. at 
844-45.   
189 Amos, 483 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).   
190 See supra discussion Part IV; Hansmann, supra note 109, at 840. 
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further break down whether “donative mutual” or “donative entrepreneurial” entities would be 
exempt.  Donative mutual organizations are primarily controlled by their patrons, and donative 
entrepreneurial organizations are primarily free from the control of patrons.191  Most religious 
entities would likely be free from the control of their patrons, provided the definition of 
“patrons” included individuals that received or benefited from the services provided; however, if 
the definition included registered members of the organization or congregation, it would be a 
closer call whether an organization would be “donative mutual” or “donative entrepreneurial.”  
Additionally, under Hansmann’s model, the donors or grantors that fund a donative nonprofit 
organization do not generally have a connection to the recipients of the goods or services, which 
makes the nonprofit structure work.192  It might be difficult for the Court to enforce such a 
requirement in the case of religious organizations because the donors could be members of the 
religious organization, and could consequently have a connection with recipients of their 
donations, especially if the donations went towards other members of the organization.193      
 Ultimately, if the Supreme Court does implement a more precise definition of “nonprofit” 
into the Amos framework, it will have to enter into some kind of case-by-case inquiry to 
determine whether organizations meet the actual definition.  The justices in Amos were opposed 
to examining the activities of religious organizations’ functions to determine if they are religious 
or secular because of the desire to avoid excessive entanglement with religious entities.  If the 
                                                 
191 See supra discussion Part IV; Hansmann, supra note 109, at 842.  The control aspect also brings up another 
important issue of nonprofit governance, and that is accountability in the nonprofit sector.  Although it might be 
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consider that some level of accountability must be enforced in order for nonprofit organizations to remain a thriving 
part of the American economic and even religious landscape.  See Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-
Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 210-12 (2004) 
(suggesting that protection of donors’ expectations and understandings, and protecting assets from misuse or loss, 
are important goals of nonprofit organizations).  See also Peggy Sasso, Comment, Searching for Trust in the Not-
for-Profit Boardroom: Looking Beyond the Duty of Obedience to Ensure Accountability, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1485 
(2003) (discussing the duty of obedience in nonprofit corporate law). 
192 Hansmann, supra note 109, at 847. 
193 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (discussing why the nonprofit structure generally works when the 
donors of funds or resources have no connection to the recipients or beneficiaries of a nonprofit’s activities).  
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original purpose behind Title VII is to be honored, and if the Supreme Court’s holding in Amos is 
to be properly curtailed so as not to exempt activities that are not truly “nonprofit,” a case-by-
case approach is necessary at least to determine the “nonprofit” issue; this would still allow for a 
categorical exemption for any religious and secular activity of a religious institution, provided it 
fell into the “nonprofit” category.  Scott McClure has explained that a categorical exemption for 
for-profit activities would violate the Free Exercise rights of employees of religious entities, but 
that applying a case-by-case approach to determine whether any for-profit activities might 
deserve the exemption would be appropriate.194  While potentially bringing for-profit activity 
into the scope of § 702, McClure nonetheless advocates for a narrower extension of § 702—only 
to “those secular enterprises—both nonprofit and for-profit—that a religious organization can 
show are religious in nature and vital to the church’s religious mission.”195  McClure’s argument, 
at least as far as it extends to nonprofit activities, does have merit—the Supreme Court should 
strongly reconsider whether a categorical exemption for even nonprofit activities is appropriate, 
or whether it should go back to the drawing board and determine if the § 702 exemption should 
only apply to activities that fulfill an organization’s religious mission.  
CONCLUSION 
 The United States Supreme Court should revisit its holding in Amos and provide a more 
precise definition of “nonprofit activity.”  In order to avoid problems with the Establishment 
Clause and the possible government preference of religious entities over their secular 
counterparts in the employment context, the § 702 exemption cannot sweep too broadly.  The 
Court might hold that only religious organizations that qualified for the tax exemption under § 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code; or that met the definition of “donative” nonprofit 
                                                 
194 See McClure, supra note 46, at 603-04; see supra Part IV.B. 
195 McClure, supra note 46, at 604.   
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entities; or that at least met the characteristics of independence from government, formality and 
continuity, voluntary establishment by citizens, forbidding of profits from being divided among 
members, and self-governance, would qualify as “nonprofit entities” under Amos.  Religious 
organizations that do not meet a specified definition of “nonprofit” would not be able to 
discriminate against their employees under the § 702 exemption, and would thus not have an 
unfair competitive edge over their secular counterparts.  If the Court clarified and narrowed the 
scope of the holding in Amos, Congress’s goal in enacting the Civil Rights Act of eliminating 
discrimination in the workplace would be further achieved.   
 
Footnote about how corporations losing § 501(c)(3) status because of political lobbying wouldn’t 
affect this analysis—doesn’t mean they aren’t exempt from Title VII.   
 
This is pressing now because of megachurches, McDonald’s in churches, what is a religious 
entity??  the fact that the Supreme Court has turned down LeBoon—it’s not going away 
Look at 2000, 1988 legislative history.   
